The Future of Wars: Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) by Pedron, Stephanie Mae & da Cruz, Jose de Arimateia
International Journal of Security Studies 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 2 
2020 
The Future of Wars: Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Lethal 
Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) 
Stephanie Mae Pedron 
Georgia Southern University, sp10494@georgiasouthern.edu 
Jose de Arimateia da Cruz 
Georgia Southern University & US Army War College, jdacruz@georgiasouthern.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/ijoss 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, and the 
Peace and Conflict Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pedron, Stephanie Mae and da Cruz, Jose de Arimateia (2020) "The Future of Wars: Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)," International Journal of Security Studies: Vol. 2 : 
Iss. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/ijoss/vol2/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Journal of Security Studies by an authorized editor of Nighthawks Open 
Institutional Repository. 
Abstract 
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) are a special class of weapons systems that, once 
activated, can identify and engage a target without further human intervention. Semi-autonomous 
weapons are currently in use today, but the transfer of the decision to kill to machines inevitably 
raises novel ethical, legal, and political concerns. This paper examines the current ethical debate 
concerning LAWS-use during wartime and outlines the potential security benefits and risks 
associated with the development of LAWS and other autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) 
technology. Allowing moral considerations to play a role in the development of AI weapons 
systems is crucial to upholding the principles of international humanitarian law. Depending on 
the degree of autonomy that a weapon has, it can pose distinct advantages and disadvantages that 
must be considered prior to deployment of the technology in dynamic combat settings. The 
transformative potential of LAWS in warfare cannot be ignored. 
 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this talk/article are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department 
of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
  
I. Introduction 
 Artificial intelligence (AI) is a swiftly evolving field that poses significant future impacts 
to global security because of its multitude of potential advantages (Wan, 2018). Leading nations 
like the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, and Russia are currently 
researching novel AI applications for the purpose of maintaining an asymmetric advantage over 
adversaries. The U.S. military, for example, has already incorporated AI into military operations 
in the Middle East via a strategy called Project Maven, which uses advanced computer 
algorithms to pinpoint targets from massive amounts of moving or still imagery (Pellerin, 2017). 
Owing to the current state of global affairs, it is likely that more investments in AI research will 
be made; technological advancements in public and military spheres will follow. 
 The incorporation of AI software and learning algorithms into commercial hardware has 
opened new channels for the application of AI into all sectors of society. Sustained innovation 
has essentially made many technological novelties ordinary. Considering the speed of 
innovation, it is paramount to examine some of the implications related to the convergence of 
technology and security policy, as well as the development of modern weaponry with the 
potential to alter the way warfare is conducted.  
 Progress in military technology today is often measured by a device’s ability to keep 
service members away from the area of conflict and its capacity for force-multiplication; these 
capabilities serve to reduce costs associated with waging war (Gentry & Eckert, 2014). Lethal 
Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)—colloquially known as ‘killer robots’—are of 
particular interest. LAWS are a “special class of weapons systems that utilize sensor suites and 
computer algorithms to identify and engage a target without manual human control of the 
system” (Liu & Moodie, 2019; Horowitz & Scharre, 2015; Lucas, 2016; Sayler, 2019a; Scharre, 
Horowitz, & Sayler 2015). In other words, LAWS are designed to make independent decisions 
regarding the use of lethal force. The transfer of decisions to automated weapons inevitably 
brings up several issues such as liability, proportionality, unintended escalation as a consequence 
of imminent accidents, ethical dilemmas, and more. Consideration of these issues points toward a 
fundamental change in the nature of warfare when humans yield the decision to use lethal force 
to machines. 
 LAWS are an element of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) third offset strategy, which 
entails the formulation and integration of tactics that ensure that the U.S. maintains its 
asymmetric power advantage over adversaries worldwide (Pellerin, 2016). However, no statute 
currently governs the deployment of LAWS. Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, which 
establishes guidelines for the development and use of autonomous weapons systems has, in 
effect, become the domestic policy on military-grade autonomous weaponry (Lucas, 2016). The 
lack of congressional guidance elicits many political and moral anxieties, considering the 
potential antipersonnel lethality of the technology. 
 While LAWS raises several ethical, legal, political, and security concerns, this paper 
examines the current ethical debate associated with the development and use of lethal 
autonomous weaponry. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part will define several key 
terms necessary for better understanding LAWS. The second part considers some of the plausible 
(security-related) benefits and risks inherent in LAWS research and use in order to aid the moral 
concerns examined in the succeeding section. The third part will simultaneously consider ethical 
issues and supporting and opposing arguments concerning the desire for an international LAWS 
ban. Finally, the fourth part will offer recommendations for nation-states going forward and a 
few concluding remarks. 
 II. Defining AI, Autonomy, and Autonomous Weapons 
 Debate concerning the expansion of AI has grown more complex in recent years. The 
language used to depict robots is often ambiguous due to the interdisciplinary nature of the 
subject. Before delving into the potential advantages and risks of LAWS, it is first necessary to 
establish a working definition of AI and the related subject of autonomy, which is part of what 
differentiates LAWS from other autonomous weapon systems (AWS). On February 11, 2019, 
President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 13859 on Maintaining American 
Leadership in Artificial Intelligence. EO 13859 states that, “artificial intelligence (AI) promises 
to drive growth of the United States economy, enhance our [U.S] economic and national 
security, and improve our quality of life” (Executive Order 13859). On § 9 of EO 13859, 
artificial intelligence means “the full extent of Federal investments in AI, to include: R & D of 
core AI techniques and technologies; AI prototype systems; application and adaptation of AI 
techniques; architectural and systems support of AI; and cyberinfrastructure, data sets, and 
standards for AI” (EO 13859).  
 Owing to distinct approaches of research in AI, no universal definition of it exists. 
However, H.R. 5515 (115th Congress) or the FY 2019 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) does provide a framework for the purpose of the bill. NDAA § 238, defines artificial 
intelligence as: 
(1) Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without 
significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and improve performance when 
exposed to data sets.  
(2) An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, or other context that 
solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or 
physical action.  
(3) An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, including cognitive architectures and 
neural networks.  
(4) A set of techniques, including machine learning, that is designed to approximate a cognitive task.  
(5) An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent software agent or 
embodied robot that achieves goals using perception, planning, reasoning, learning, 
communicating, decision-making, and acting. 
 As outlined above, AI encompasses a range of technologies with assorted capabilities, 
many of which have the potential to advance military operations in several areas. AI applications 
for defense are diverse. They have proven useful for reconnaissance and surveillance missions, 
and have marked potential to speed-up cyberspace operations (Sayler, 2019b). For example, the 
2016 Cyber Grand Challenge hosted by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 
(DARPA) exhibited the budding aptitude of future AI-enabled cyber tools by challenging 
participants to develop an AI algorithm that could detect and patch software vulnerabilities in 
seconds instead of months (Fraze, 2016; Sayler, 2019b). AI-enhanced cyber tools have marked 
potential to detect derived viruses, suspicious nodes in networks, and identify system oddities 
(Asiru, Dlamini, Blackledge, 2017; Kubovič, Košinár, & Jánošík, 2018). AI technology is also 
being incorporated into military vessels to communicate with other vehicles, navigate routes, 
determine distance between vehicles and surrounding objects, and improve safety and vehicle 
performance. (Canis, 2018). Similarly, offensive applications of AI also vary. They may boost 
the destructive competencies of legitimate military forces or third party attackers. A hacker 
group’s intrusion capability, for example, may be augmented by AI applications that allow its 
members to generate new evasive malware variants, combine attack techniques, disseminate 
propaganda, and implement automatic self-destruct mechanisms in case of detection (Kubovič, 
Košinár, & Jánošík, 2018). In other words, according to James S. Johnson, a postdoctoral 
research fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the 
Middlebury Institute of International Studies, “AI is best understood, therefore, as a potentially 
powerful force multiplier of these developments” (Johnson, 2020).  
 Assistant Professor Rebecca Crootof (2015) in her article, “The Killer Robots Are Here: 
Legal and Policy Implications,” asserts that “autonomy carries vastly different meanings in 
different fields” and due to these mixed understandings, experts can often speak past each other. 
For the purpose of this paper, we will use the definition of autonomy provided by the U.S. Army 
Robotic and Autonomous System Strategy (2017), which states that, “[autonomy is] the 
condition or quality of being self-governing to achieve an assigned mission based on the 
system’s own situational awareness (integrated sensing, perceiving, analyzing) planning and 
decision-making.” The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous System Strategy (2017) further 
emphasizes that independence is “a point on a spectrum that can be tailored to the specific 
mission, level of acceptable risk, and degree of human-machine teaming.” According to this 
view, autonomy can thus be seen as a continuum and not a dichotomy. Weapon systems occupy 
different points according to how broadly they can identify and engage a specified target as well 
as their degree of self-governance over their pre-programmed or machine-learned actions. 
Technology on the lower end of the autonomy spectrum (i.e. semi-autonomous weapons) are 
currently employed by the U.S. military. The Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), for 
example, which has been used by the U.S. Navy since the 1980s. CIWS provides battleships with 
a mechanized defense system. It can automatically “detect, evaluate, engage, and perform kill 
assessments against anti-ship missiles (ASM) and high-speed aircraft threats” (U.S. Navy: Fact 
File, 2019). 
 Similar to AI, there is no internationally acceptable definition of AWS. Moreover, these 
weapons cannot be easily categorized because they incorporate a diverse range of technologies 
(Patrick, 2019). U.S. DoD Directive 3000.9, however, identifies two types of weapon systems 
according to their level of autonomy—autonomous and semi-autonomous. LAWS fall under the 
first category, which refers to a system that, once started, can engage targets without further 
human intervention. Unlike other countries, the U.S. definition of autonomous weapons specifies 
the inclusion of human-supervised AWS; this is a system designed to provide people with the 
ability to terminate operation of the weapon system following activation. Emphasis on possible 
human intercession is necessary to assuage concerns related to the use of LAWS in a combat 
environment. 
 
III. Potential (Security) Benefits and Risks 
 Automation has been a boon to all segments of society. It has not only made lives easier, 
but also paved the way for technological revolutions in both the public and private sectors. 
Benefits in progress related to automation are numerous. From a national security perspective, 
classically automated non-lethal systems have already had profound effects on the way the U.S. 
conducts war. Automation provides an immediate force-multiplier effect because of the 
machine’s ability to conduct basic tasks such as product assembly, material handling, and 
palletization, thereby removing the need to hire and train personnel for those duties (Lucas, 
2016). But the potential benefits of lethal automation are even greater. During instances of armed 
conflict, complex technologies that employ intricate tools and algorithms allow for the 
mechanization of more numerous and difficult tasks. Using a maximally autonomous weapon in 
combat may also be advantageous in environments with poor or broken down communication 
links, since they have the capacity to continue operating on their own.  
 AI are generally capable of reacting faster than humans; this would ultimately suit the 
quickening pace of combat spurred by technological innovation. The quick reaction times of 
AWS may result in an overwhelming advantage in the field at the beginning of a conflict 
(Sharkey, 2018). In certain circumstances, AI may even supersede the decision-making processes 
of humans (Surber, 2018). Owing to the absence of negative emotions related to personal gain, 
self-interest, and loss, AI may also make more objective choices in times of crisis that could save 
lives (ICRC, 2011; Sassóli, 2014). Furthermore, machines are not subject to the same endurance 
limitations as people, so LAWS would have the potential to operate in combat settings for 
extended periods of time or until its termination.  
 Depending on the system’s design, LAWS could feasibly replace combatants, thereby 
eliminating the need for human deployments in high-risk areas. In other words, it can reduce the 
risk to American lives without diminishing U.S. combat capabilities. This feature of AWS, 
according to Nathan Leys (2018) in his article, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International 
Crises, “may reduce U.S. domestic political opposition to military interventions, especially in 
humanitarian contexts without an immediately apparent U.S. national interest.” This could prove 
useful for long-term political strategies, although that is based on the assumption that leaders 
restrain themselves from waging war only because of military casualties or the derived social 
consequences that arise from it. If that is the case, then development of LAWS might also 
encourage aggression (Bocherty, 2012; Wallach, 2015).  
 Alexander Kott (2018), Chief Scientist of the Army Research Laboratory, stated that one 
of the many remarkable features of AI is its ability to make things “individually and collectively 
more intelligent.” But at the same time, it also makes situations more volatile. Future deployment 
of LAWS presents several security challenges such as hacking of the system or unanticipated 
failure, particularly if the system utilizes machine learning applications. LAWS are expected to 
enhance a military’s lethal force, so issues following their deployment can have mighty 
consequences. Since many AI systems are first developed in the public sphere, and then 
repurposed for military use, integration errors can occur once the system is transferred to a 
combat environment (Sayler, 2019b). Consequences will be dependent on the type of failure that 
occurs. For example, unintended escalation in a crisis may occur if LAWS engage targets other 
than what the human operator intended or if adversaries deliberately introduce data that produces 
an error in the system. Human mistakes are typically contained to a single individual. But errors 
in complex AI systems, especially if they are deployed at scale, risk simultaneous—perhaps even 
inevitable—failure (Scharre, 2017). Moreover, the danger of machines producing unconventional 
outcomes that cannot be immediately terminated—if the outcome can be terminated at all—may 
result in a destabilizing effect if the system spirals out of huma0n control.  
 Another conceivable risk is that LAWS might trigger an arms race among nation-states 
because of their immense tactical advantage. At present, global reactions to LAWS are divided, 
despite the fact that no such weapons have been fully developed (Lewis, 2015). However, many 
countries currently utilize semi-autonomous weapons and continue to devote resources to the 
development of fully autonomous technology. For example, the U.S. has long repurposed 
unmanned systems like drones to target members of international terrorist organizations. In these 
operations, a human operator always gives the order to kill (Stone, 2013). Autonomous weapons 
also use comparable technology to those in the public sector, which suggests that countries can 
indirectly develop tools for AWS as they support the advancement of civilian-based AI 
(Schroeder, 2016). 
 Saliency of LAWS has reached a point where over 60 non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have banned together to promote a movement called Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. 
Advocates of this campaign have urged several governments and the United Nations (UN) to 
enact a global ban on lethal autonomous weapons. International stances, however, remain split. 
Although the majority of nation-states support a preemptive LAWS ban, those that oppose it 
have more clout on the international stage as shown in Table 01. 
Table 1: Nation Stances on LAWS Ban 
Support Other Oppose 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Austria 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Djibouti 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Holy See 
Iraq 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Uganda 
Venezuela 
Zimbabwe 
Chinaab Australia 
Belgium 
Francea 
Germany 
Israela 
South Koreaa 
Russiaa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Turkey 
United Statesa 
United Kingdoma 
a Countries most capable of developing LAWS 
b Supports a ban on the development, but not the use of LAWS  
Source: Liu, Z., & Moodie, M. (2019). International Discussions Concerning Lethal 
Autonomous Weapon Systems. Congressional Research Service. 
 
 Rushed development of LAWS may result in failures to comply with international laws 
of war, since these weapons are fundamentally different from any prior form of weaponry in that 
they make independent decisions about how to act. The complexity of these systems may make it 
impossible for people to predict what they will do in every possible situation. LAWS therefore 
presents a gap in the existing legal order by underscoring the inadequacy of the current 
established means of holding an individual or state liable for actions conducted during wartime 
(Crootof, 2016). Additionally, proliferation may amplify the offensive competencies of small 
countries—possibly even independent actors. Rapid, disproportionate increases in the military 
capabilities of relatively small nation-states can have detrimental effects on the current global 
state of affairs. Should these nation-states opt to hire technically capable individuals from third 
parties that have the skills to gradually develop or hack LAWS or similar sophisticated 
weaponry, then global security may be undermined. 
 There is the possibility that current hazards and outside pressure from NGOs to establish 
limits on autonomy in weapon systems will overwhelm arguments in favor of continued 
development of LAWS, but for the moment, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
(CCW)—which works to ensure the protection of civilians from particularly inhumane weapons 
of war—has yet to produce any specific policy recommendations for their member states about 
limiting the potential use or development of LAWS. This is partially due to the fact that many of 
their larger members opted to postpone any tangible verdicts regarding LAWS even after a 
discussion about the moral, political, and legal issues, as well as the prospective advantages and 
disadvantages of using them in combat (Acheson, 2017). Regardless of whether an international 
agreement restricting LAWS is reached, a contingency plan against such technology is essential 
(Price, Walker, & Wiley, 2018). 
 In sum, the progression of LAWS poses a number of unique benefits and risks. Rushed 
incorporation of AWS into military strategies without proper consideration of the perils that 
come with them can result in disastrous consequences. It is also important to note that, while it is 
possible to predict some of the potential dangers and vulnerabilities of LAWS—and, in turn, take 
steps to avoid or counter them—unpredictable outcomes may still arise once the systems are 
introduced to combat settings. Captain Michael Ferguson (2019), an intelligence officer at the 
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, stated that, “Advocates of militarized AI often 
dismiss concerns under the assumption that kinks will be worked out by the time the technology 
is operationalized for military application… [but it is more likely that] the military will be forced 
to adapt to these kinks mid-conflict, which presents a broad spectrum of perilous dilemmas to the 
joint force.”  
 Recognizing the necessity of combining strategy and technological development is only 
the first step. To assess LAWS, it is vital to consider both civilian and military development, as 
well as errors that could result from machines being transferred to different environments prior to 
their use. Additionally, policymakers, manufacturers, and relevant security agencies must work 
in tandem to consider how any scientific leaps in the field might change future diplomatic 
relations. The overall influence that the development of LAWS will have on modern methods of 
warfare will depend heavily on the extent to which nation-states can maximize the equipment’s 
potential advantages, while simultaneously minimizing its risks.  
 
IV. Ethical Implications 
 The possibility of LAWS rendering the final decision to apply lethal force has sparked 
worldwide discussion regarding fundamental issues related to the value of human life, 
accountability for operations, and human dignity. Advocates of a preemptive LAWS ban posit 
that autonomous weapon systems contravene every human beings inherent right to life under 
Article 6 § 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states 
that, “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” (OHCHR, n.d.). The ICCPR was adopted by the 
U.N. General Assembly in 1966 to ensure that its parties acknowledge and respect the rights of 
individuals; it is crucial for global human rights laws. Similarly, the Geneva Conventions and its 
Additional Protocols lie at the center of international humanitarian practices by limiting the 
cruelty of warfare. Organizations like Human Rights Watch (2014) have argued that abiding by 
the prerequisites for lawful force outlined within the Geneva Conventions articles, LAWS would 
require immense data regarding an infinite number of situations. The sheer amount of possible 
scenarios means that machines will likely not be able to adequately respond to every 
circumstance they might face. 
 International security researchers Anja Dahlmann and Marcel Dickow from the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs argue that, “machines do not understand what it 
means to kill a human being” (2019). One of LAWS’ greatest advantages—that is, their lack of 
emotion—is also a central flaw. A robot’s inability to reflect over its actions or to comprehend 
the value of an individual’s life and the significance of loss essentially turns the humans targeted 
into little more than data points or objects (Dahlmann & Dickow, 2019; Docherty, 2014; Purves, 
Jenkins, & Strawser, 2015). The value of human life is, in essence, diminished. Naturally, this 
breaches the dignity of the person, which some describe as the underlying principle of the 
international law of human rights (Docherty, 2014; Heyns, 2013). In the same vein, proponents 
of a LAWS ban argue that by their nature, machines are not moral actors (Lucas, 2016). 
Therefore, they cannot be held responsible for their actions. Should a machine perform an illegal 
action in combat—or, essentially, a war crime—it would be impossible to effectively punish or 
deter the weapon. Unless LAWS can be developed to possess certain human qualities, then no 
amount of technological improvements can remedy these issues. 
 Alternatively, other scholars argue that LAWS might enhance respect for the value of 
human life because of their potential ability to distance human soldiers from combat zones 
(Williams & Scharre, 2015). Although service members agree to risk their lives for the interests 
of the state, their government also has a responsibility to protect and respect their rights as 
citizens. Opponents of a preemptive LAWS ban also maintain that the ethical arguments put 
forth are based on lopsided anthropomorphism of autonomy (Kanwar, 2011; Singer, 2009; 
Sparrow, 2016). This may stem, in part, from the lack of tangible development of the technology. 
The result is that LAWS are treated as irregular wartime participants, rather than sophisticated 
weapons used to amplify human action, similar to predator drones, fire-and-forget missiles, or 
tools developed for cyber-operations, which all have the capacity to separate human agents and 
cause immense damage. Viewing LAWS in this manner counters the argument that the use of 
LAWS violates human dignity because the algorithm that prompts the weapon’s “decision to 
kill” is not ethically meaningful (Sparrow, 2016). Rather, it can be likened to the launching of a 
missile by a soldier ordered to do so by a superior officer. In other words, looking beyond the 
weapon to the human agent(s) responsible may mitigate certain ethical concerns. Furthermore, it 
would be helpful to examine the intent of the manufacturers and the parameters that the superior 
in the chain of command put in place prior to deployment of LAWS to mollify fears regarding 
liability in the event of system failure. 
 The decision to kill an enemy combatant has been debated upon countless times over the 
decades. The dawn of LAWS, however, has been essential to transforming present discourse by 
centering the concept that the verdict to employ lethal force is part of an intricate decision-
making process with disseminated responsibility on all levels. Allies determinations, political 
relations, standing rules of engagement, orders from a superior, and ability to distinguish friend 
from foe in “the fog of war”1 are all factors in the decision to end a life, regardless if the one 
carrying out the action is man or machine. To judge how morally meaningful relinquishing the 
decision to apply lethal force to military-grade robotics is, then more profound international 
discussion, in addition to consensus regarding how the potential dangers of LAWS might 
outweigh their tactical benefits are necessary. Robert Sparrow (2016), one of the founding 
members of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, suggests that ultimately, the 
strength of an ethical case for a LAWS treaty depends on assessments concerning “the weight of 
consequentialist and deontological considerations in the ethics of war . . . if our main 
consideration is to reduce the number of noncombatant deaths, it becomes easier to imagine 
AWS being ethical.” 
 There is a strong justification for approaching the continued research of LAWS with 
caution, bearing in mind the technology’s potential disruptive impact on international security. In 
fact, similar moral arguments were made concerning nuclear weapons before they were 
prohibited (Johnson & Axinn, 2013; Szilard, 1945). Past events impart the necessity of 
establishing ethical positions of LAWS prior to their physical development, but enforcing a total 
 
1 Von Clausewitz, C. (1832). On War. (p. 89). London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co. 
ban may be viewed as premature. Efforts to completely bar LAWS could impose limits on other 
AI applications, stunting development of new machinery usable not only in military contexts, but 
also in the civilian sphere. As Paul Scharre, a LAWS expert at the Center for a New American 
Security, stated in his 2017 testimony to the UN, “If we agree to foreswear some technology, we 
could end up giving up some uses of automation that could make war more humane. On the other 
hand, a headlong rush into a future of increasing autonomy, with no discussion of where it is 
taking us, is not in humanity’s interests either.” 
 Most of the ethical issues associated with the use of LAWS stems from concerns 
pertaining to a machine’s ability to appraise human life and its overall technological 
sophistication. To allow moral considerations to play an appropriate role in the development of 
these systems, policymakers would need to clearly define key terms such as autonomy and 
agency; express their stance regarding who—or what—is responsible for fatal actions carried out 
by LAWS; clarify priorities in autonomous weapons development; and be as transparent as 
possible regarding progress in the field. It is imperative that legislators ensure that future policies 
drive technological development and not stifle it (Hall, 2017). 
 
V. Conclusion 
 As technology advances, nation-states will ultimately decide whether to employ LAWS 
in combat settings. There are distinct advantages and disadvantages to complex automated 
weaponry, from increased military capabilities to unpredictable actions that could lead to run-
away escalation. Many of the criticisms that LAWS faces are related to its projected use (Hall, 
2017).  The failure or loss of control of a fully autonomous weapon could lead to mass slaughter, 
unintended casualties, and conflict escalation (Scharre, 2016). Utilizing LAWS, as well as other 
broad incorporations of AI technology for military operations, means acknowledging these 
potential risks.  
 Central to the debate regarding LAWS are the various ethical, legal, and political 
consequences that they might have on the international stage. Ethical issues are primarily related 
to accountability, decision-making, and whether granting machines the power to automatically 
engage and eliminate a target demeans human life. Depending on the individual’s interpretation 
of human dignity and their view of autonomy as it pertains to weaponry, LAWS may be seen as 
compromising some of the basic tenets of humanitarian law (Sharkey, 2018). This is primarily 
due to a machine’s lack of emotion. An automated weapon’s inability to comprehend the 
significance of human life can be both an advantage and a flaw during wartime. 
 Currently, global stances involving an international LAWS ban are divided. Many NGOs 
have formed a coalition in support of a ban, and organizations like the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) have issued reports stating that countries should establish “limits on 
autonomy in weapon systems” (2018). There are also several nation-states that seek to regulate 
the use of LAWS, while others strive to prohibit LAWS research completely. The latter, 
however, is next to impossible without a dominant international institution capable of enforcing 
such an agreement (Saad & Gosal, 2019). Notably, the countries most capable of developing 
LAWS are either against a ban or desire to postpone a decision regarding one. Regardless of 
these differences, the lack of international action translates into ambiguity concerning the 
ongoing development of AWS. It is incumbent on nation-states to establish an international body 
dedicated to evaluating the interdisciplinary implications of LAWS, exercising oversight over 
breakthroughs in AI, and cooperating to develop common expectations and operating procedures 
for future destabilizing weaponry. A comprehensive legal framework and norms should be 
developed and formalized before innovation can outpace current rules of war. Creating 
international structures, however, can be a politically fraught and lengthy process. In the 
meantime, nation-states might opt to develop domestic committees that ensure greater oversight, 
execute national defense strategies, and define benchmarks that measure the performance of new 
AI weaponry. 
 To avoid perilous outcomes, it is vital for states to acknowledge that they cannot 
unilaterally address the dangers of advancements in automated military technology. For countries 
that have a stake in an international treaty regarding LAWS, the public image of automated 
weaponry and associated technology will be critical to future issue development, since brisk 
changes in mass perception often herald waves of mobilization. One way of influencing 
international discussion of LAWS is by specifying how these technologies can be used to boost 
public security or to support citizens in the commercial sector. An AI’s ability to rapidly comb 
through a vast amount of data, for example, would be useful in both military and civilian 
contexts. Other methods of multilateral involvement include engaging with key allies to promote 
humanitarian objectives, participating in international forums to discuss domestic policy 
differences, and stressing additional key points—such as fatal aptitude—that bring diverse 
perspectives into the overarching dialogue (CNA, n.d.; Trumbull, 2019).  
 In today’s globalized world, cooperation is essential to crafting effective regulatory 
structures and international norms that can help manage the strategic risks associated with the 
imminent operation of LAWS and other emerging technologies. Without a supervisory 
framework in place, we risk another overdue response similar to what occurred following the use 
of the first atomic bomb. According to M.A. Thomas, professor at the U.S. Army School of 
Advanced Military Studies, “AI will likely create vulnerabilities as well as advantages. It may be 
error prone or biased, unpredictable, unreliable, opaque, and less capable of fine discrimination” 
in the different operational and strategic levels of warfare (Thomas, 2020). Despite its 
technological uncertainties, AI is here to stay. As Johnson succinctly states, “In today’s 
multipolar geopolitical power . . . relatively low-risk and low-cost AI-augmented AWS 
capability—with ambiguous rules of engagement and absent a robust normative and legal 
framework—will become an increasingly enticing asymmetric option to erode an advanced 
military’s deterrence and resolve (Johnson, 2020). As U.S. Air Force Major General Robert H. 
Latiff (2017) argues, “The modern milieu is a toxic brew of global instability, economic 
upheaval, political polarization, and rapid technological change on a scale not seen in several 
generations, perhaps ever.” In conclusion, we can ignore the advancement of AI, LAWS, and 
AWS at our peril. 
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